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PEDOPHILES, POLITICS, AND THE BALANCE OF POWER:
THE FALLOUT FROM UNITED STATES V. SCHAEFER AND THE
EROSION OF STATE AUTHORITY
INTRODUCTION
In a September 2007 opinion that triggered a national response, a
three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals absolved Kansas
citizen William Schaefer of his federal convictions for receipt and pos-
session of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252.1 The court held
that the government failed to prove the interstate elements of Schaefer's
crimes, thereby stripping the federal government of its jurisdiction over
the case.2 The critical issue involved the question of whether Internet use
alone, without any other evidence, is sufficient to prove a nexus to inter-
state commerce. 3 The court answered this question in the negative, re-
fusing to assume that Schaefer's use of the Internet to view child p6rno-
graphy involved knowing transportation of images across state lines.4
Lacking direct evidence of interstate transport, the court overturned
Schaefer's convictions.5
The Schaefer decision outraged Congress, which promptly respond-
ed by passing legislation to extend the reach of federal child pornography
statutes to the full scope of Congress's Commerce Clause powers.6 With
President George W. Bush's signature on October 8, 2008, federal prose-
cutors gained jurisdiction over all production, distribution, receipt, and
possession of child pornography that substantially affects interstate
commerce. 7 While this knee-jerk reaction may close the loophole that
allowed Schaefer to walk out of federal prison, it will also limit the ap-
plication of state child pornography laws by vastly extending the federal
government's intrusion into these traditionally local crimes. Was Con-
gress's sweeping reaction appropriate? Or was it an unwarranted re-
sponse to a weakly prosecuted case? This Comment argues that Con-
gress overreacted to the Tenth Circuit's Schaefer decision and expanded
federal jurisdiction into an area of law where state statutes provide more
effective solutions.
1. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 1198.
3. Id. at 1200.
4. Id. at 1205.
5. Id. at 1207.
6. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 Stat.
4001 (2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-52 (West 2009)).
7. See Rep. Boyda, Attorney General Steve Six Announce New Law to Protect Kansas Kids
From Predators, U.S. FED. NEWS, Oct. 15, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 20424888.
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I. CONGRESS HAS CONSISTENTLY EXPANDED FEDERAL JURISDICTION
OVER CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CRIMES SINCE 1977
The explosive growth of the Internet during the past two decades
has generated myriad benefits, including access to global markets, unim-
peded flow of information, and broadening opportunities for entertain-
ment. However, it has also produced tremendous fallout of illicit activity
such as the international exchange of child pornography. 8 Congress's
response to the mushrooming child pornography problem evolved with
the Internet and with the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, following an often repeated pattern of expanding federal jurisdic-
tion.
A. The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977
During the late 1970s, when the Internet was nothing more than a
loosely-linked network of military and research computers,9 Congress
enacted the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of
1977.10 The act primarily targeted the use of children in commercial
development of obscene pornography and commercial distribution of
obscene child pornography.' This initial federal effort drew motivation
from a woeful lack of state legislation; at the time, only six states prohi-
bited the use of children in the production of pornography. 12 While Con-
gress asserted that sexual exploitation of children was a problem that
could not be "adequately controlled by state and local authorities," it
acknowledged that "[w]hat is needed is a coordinated effort by federal,
state and local law enforcement officials aimed at eradicating this form
of child abuse."'13 As a result, the act's legislative history expresses con-
gressional intent to limit the scope of the federal power to those pro-
scribed activities involving transportation in the United States mail or "in
interstate or foreign commerce."' 14 Congress viewed the nexus to inter-
state commerce as "necessary to preserve the balance between the law
enforcement responsibilities of federal officials on one [hand] . . . and
their state and local counterparts, on the other."' 5 Specifically, Congress
intended federal jurisdiction to stop short of "isolated, individual acts...
8. See Laura Ann Forbes, Comment, A More Convenient Crime: Why States Must Regulate
Internet-Related Criminal Activity Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 20 PACE L. REv. 189,
189-90 (1999).
9. Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNEr SocIETY, Dec. 10, 2003,
http:llwww.isoc.orglinternet/historylbrief.shtml.
10. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-53, 2423
(West 2009)).
11. Id.
12. S. REP. No. 95-438, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40,48.
13. Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 48.
14. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 53.
15. Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 53.
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. [W]hich often are more appropriately the subject of state or local con-
cern."
16
Over the next seven years, federal prosecutors secured only twenty-
eight indictments under the 1977 law. 17 Congress blamed these meager
results on the legislation's pecuniary restrictions, which limited its appli-
cation to child pornography produced for sale or distribution for sale.'
8
Recognizing that many producers and distributors of child pornography
often act with prurient motives rather than profit motives, Congress went
back to the drawing board.' 9
B. The Child Protection Act of 1984
By the time Congress reevaluated its first-generation child porno-
graphy statutes in 1984, at least forty-seven states had enacted laws cri-
minalizing either the distribution of child pornography or the use of
children in the production of pornography.20 However, rather than wait-
ing for the states to experiment with additional legislation, Congress
opted to enact the Child Protection Act of 1984.21 This effort closed
many of the loopholes inherent in the 1977 legislation and occupied
much of the remaining legal territory related to production, distribution,
and receipt of child pornography. The 1984 amendments accomplished
this by (1) eliminating the commercial restrictions on federal jurisdiction
over criminal distribution of child pornography, (2) eliminating the ob-
scenity requirement for child pornography crimes, and (3) adding a crime
for reproducing child pornography.22
While the changes effected by the Child Protection Act significantly
broadened its reach, the statutes retained the jurisdictional hooks that
required transport of proscribed materials in the mail or "in interstate or
foreign commerce., 23  These jurisdictional limitations preserved the
principles of federalism, leaving the states free to legislate and prosecute
within the sphere of purely local, intrastate activities while allowing fed-
16. Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 53. The initial version of the legislation, Senate
bill S. 1011, 95th Cong. (1977) introduced by Senator William Roth (R-DE), included language
extending federal jurisdiction to knowing transportation, shipment, or mailing of child pornography
"in such a manner as to affect interstate or foreign commerce." Id. at 25, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 60. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, while crediting Senator Roth for
bringing the problem of child pornography to the attention of the Senate, expressly rejected his
proposal because of its jurisdictional deficiencies, which were perceived to extend to "purely local
acts" that "should be left to local authorities." Id at 11, 26, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 48,
61.
17. H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 2 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 493.
18. Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 493.
19. See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 493.
20. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 & n.2 (1982).
21. Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-53, 2423
(West 2009)).
22. H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 498.
23. Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-53, 2423
(West 2009)).
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eral investigators to bring their significant resource advantage to bear
against larger, multi-jurisdictional cases of child pornography. The ju-
risdictional balance struck by the Child Protection Act of 1984 would
gradually tip in favor of the federal government as the exigencies of the
Internet revolution changed the modus operandi of pedophiles around the
world.
C. The Child Protection Act of 1988 Incorporated Computer
Transmissions
Even before the rise of the Internet as the new central nervous sys-
tem of commerce and communications, Congress modified federal sta-
tutes in 1988 to proscribe knowing transportation, shipment, receipt, or
distribution of child pornography in interstate commerce by any means,
including by computer.24 With this change, Congress unambiguously
expanded its jurisdiction in child pornography crimes to include not only
the Internet as a conduit for criminal activity, but electronic data as a
form of proscribed material.2 5
D. Schaefer's Prosecution Under the 2003 PROTECT Act Exemplifies
Expanded Federal Jurisdiction
Ultimately, the government prosecuted Schaefer under the
PROTECT Act of 2003, a version of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 substantially
similar to the 1988 Child Protection Act, but with tougher sentences and
penalties. 26 The thirty-year evolution of federal child pornography sta-
tutes leading up to Schaefer's conviction and appeal reflect a gradual but
unmistakable expansion of federal jurisdiction. The slow jurisdictional
accretions reflect Congress's efforts to keep pace with the rapidly chang-
ing approaches of child pornographers and the dawn of the digital revo-
lution. The initial statute, which proscribed commercial child pornogra-
phy and preserved a role for state jurisdiction over local crimes, gave
way to an expansive and far-reaching law which, coupled with the proli-
feration of Internet child pornography, reached right into William Schae-
27fer's personal computer in Kansas.
II. UNITED STATES V. SCHAEFER DEMONSTRATES THE EFFECT OF
JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENTS IN FEDERAL STATUTES
During early 2003, William Schaefer used his credit cards to sub-
scribe to five members-only websites allowing access to electronic im-
24. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7511, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§
2251-53, 2423 (West 2009)).
25. See United States v. Wilson, 182 F.3d 737, 741 (10th Cir. 1999).
26. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-53,
2423 (West 2009)). PROTECT is an acronym for Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end
the Exploitation of Children Today. Id.
27. See United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007).
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ages of child pornography.28 An Immigration and Customs Enforcement
investigation into the company processing his payments led federal au-
thorities to search Schaefer's home, where they seized a desktop com-
puter and several writable compact discs ("CDs").29 The computer con-
tained a total of 999 images of child pornography, which were stored in
the computer's unallocated clusters and Internet cache.3° Investigators
also found several short video clips and images on the CDs; upon inspec-
tion, they determined that eleven of those images contained child porno-
graphy.31 The resulting prosecution and appeal triggered another vast
expansion of federal jurisdiction over child pornography and a question-
able federal intrusion into criminal territory typically regulated by states.
A. The District Court Convicted Schaefer on Thin Evidence
The government charged Schaefer with one count of receiving child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of
possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(4)(B).32 Under these statutes, the government must prove that
the images in question or the materials used to create the images were
"mailed, or... shipped or transported using any means or facility of in-
terstate or foreign commerce... by any means including by computer..
S., The district court opinion focused almost exclusively on establish-
ing Schaefer's knowing receipt and possession of the images on the CDs,
failing to address the jurisdictional grounds that allowed the government
to prosecute Schaefer under federal law. 34 The conspicuous lack of at-
tention to the interstate elements of the crimes left a gaping hole in the
case and ample grounds for Schaefer's appeal.35
B. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Faced a Difficult Policy Decision
On appeal, Schaefer focused on the jurisdictional elements of §
2252(a) and argued that the government failed to present sufficient facts
showing that the images contained on the CDs actually crossed state
lines. 36 Thus, claimed Schaefer, the government failed to prove the ele-
28. Id.; Brief of Appellee at 3, Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197 (No. 06-3080), 2007 WL 1379291.
29. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198.
30. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 28, at 4. As described by the 10th Circuit, unallocated
clusters are "hidden files on the computer hard drive not usually accessible to a user"; the Internet
cache is a file that contains information about recently loaded websites that allow the site to be
loaded faster on subsequent visits. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198 nn.2-3.
31. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198.
32. Id. at 1197.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2005) (amended 2008).
34. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1199. Schaefer opted for a bench trial over a jury trial. In its opi-
nion, the district court concluded that Schaefer did not knowingly download the hundreds of images
found on his computer hard drive; rather, his computer automatically stored those images without his
knowledge. However, based on the CD evidence, the court found Schaefer guilty of receiving and
possessing child pornography and handed down two concurrent 70-month prison terms. Id. at 1198-
99 & n.5.
35. See id. at 1199.
36. Id. at 1199-1200.
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ment of the crime requiring an interstate nexus. Notably, Schaefer chal-
lenged only the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, intentional-
ly avoiding a constitutional challenge of the child pornography statutes
themselves.37
The significance of this distinction bears heavily upon the court's
analysis. When a defendant challenges the constitutionality of the statu-
tory jurisdictional element, the reviewing court must apply the Com-
merce Clause analysis developed under United States v. Lopez and its
progeny to determine whether Congress had the authority to regulate the
defendant's conduct under its Commerce power.38 If the court deter-
mines that Congress acted within its power, the defendant's challenge
fails and the conviction is upheld.39
However, if the defendant merely challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to satisfy an element of the crime, then the reviewing court
applies a vastly different standard of review: it examines the evidence in
a light most favorable to the government and upholds the conviction un-
less no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.40  Interpreting the elements of a criminal statute, the court
gives the words of the statute their plain meanings.4
In a feeble effort to defend the convictions, the government offered
the following evidence linking Schaefer's actions to interstate commerce:
(1) Schaefer, who resided in Kansas, paid for access to Internet
websites containing child pornography; the payments were processed
by a New Jersey company with the assistance of a Florida company;
e-mails containing usemames and passwords to the site were sent to
Schaefer's e-mail account which had been issued by a Washington
corporation;
(2) One CD found in Schaefer's possession contained movie clips
and still images of child pornography; the movie clips consisted of
foreign language films and contained embedded Internet addresses;
the still images did not contain Internet addresses, but were "quite
obviously" captured from the movie clips;
37. Id. at 1200 n.7.
38. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the United States Supreme Court
suggested that the presence of a jurisdictional element limiting the reach of a federal statute may
support the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 561-62. Thus, a challenge to the constitutionality of a
jurisdictional element invokes the Court's Commerce Clause analysis. See United States v. MacE-
wan, 445 F.3d 237, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2006).
39. See MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 244-45; United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1138-39 (10th
Cir. 2003).
40. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1199-1200.
41. Id. at 1201-02, 1204-05 (interpreting plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) , criticizing
the Third Circuit for an interpretation violating the plain terms, and concluding that the plain lan-
guage of § 2252(a) contains no "Internet exception" to the requirement to prove images moved in
interstate commerce).
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(3) A second CD found in Schaefer's possession contained sexually
explicit images of a child known to federal investigators from pre-
vious prosecutions; the government suggested that Schaefer down-
loaded the images from the Internet to the CD. 42
Based on these facts, the government argued that "[p]roof the images
came from the internet suggests an origin outside the state, and is suffi-
cient to establish the interstate nexus.
43
Schaefer countered, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that the jurisdic-
tional element of § 2252(a) requires more than a circumstantial connec-
tion to interstate commerce; rather, it requires proof that the images or
materials containing child pornography in the possession of the defen-
dant actually crossed state lines. 44 "[I1t is not enough to assume that an
Internet communication necessarily traveled across state lines in inter-
state commerce.A
5
To arrive at this conclusion, the court examined the language of §
2252(a), which incorporates the language "in ... commerce."'46 As the
Supreme Court explained in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, "[t]he
plain meaning of the words 'engaged in commerce' is narrower than the
more open-ended formulations 'affecting commerce' and 'involving
commerce,"' implying that Congress intended to limit the reach of the
statute.47 Applying this reasoning to § 2252(a), the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that "the plain terms of [the statute] convey that Congress in-
tended to punish only those who moved images or 'materials' across
state lines."4 The court's interpretation of the plain statutory language is
borne out by the acknowledged role of the states in the legislative history
of the federal child pornography statutes discussed above.49
Examining the government's case through this jurisdictional lens,
the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient. The interstate
connections provided by the processing of Schaefer's credit card pay-
ments bore no relevance to the physical movement of the CDs, or the
images they contained, across state lines.50  Additionally, none of the
evidence provided by the government foreclosed-beyond a reasonable
doubt-the possibility that the CDs in Schaefer's possession were pro-
duced by and obtained from sources entirely within the state of Kansas.
5 1
The government offered no convincing evidence that the movie clips or
42. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 28, at 9-10. Numbered items (1) through (3) have been
extracted, refined, and organized from the government's arguments in appellee's brief.
43. Id. at 9; see also Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1202.
44. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1200-01.
45. Id.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2005) (amended 2008).
47. 532 U.S. 105, 118 (2001).
48. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1202.
49. See discussion supra Part I.
50. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198-99 & n.4.
51. See id. at 1201.
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still images were produced outside of Kansas, despite the fact that some
or all of the actors in the movie clips spoke languages other than Eng-
lish.52 Similarly, the appearance of a web address in several movie clips
failed to meet the standard of proof because the government produced no
evidence that the network servers hosting that website resided outside of
Kansas.53 And finally, even if Schaefer downloaded images from the
Internet and burned them onto CDs, the record was silent with respect to
the origin of the CDs and the locations of the network servers that facili-
tated the image transfers.54 The prosecutors did not even attempt to
prove that the movie clips or images on the CDs were the same as those
residing on Schaefer's computer hard drive.55 Thus, the government had
not even proven that the images on the CDs resulted from Schaefer's use
of the Internet. Despite previous decisions acknowledging interstate
activity resulting from Internet use,56 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
government's evidence insufficiently linked Schaefer's actions to inter-
state commerce.57
Given the Tenth Circuit's strict textual interpretation of the govern-
ing statute, 58 the missing evidence of clear interstate movement of im-
ages in Schaefer's possession gave the court little choice but to reverse
the convictions. The court acknowledged that it could have taken judi-
cial notice of the link between the Internet and interstate commerce, giv-
ing factual weight to the "vanishingly remote" possibility that the images
did not cross state lines. 59 However, this alternative would invoke the
discretion of the court and expand the jurisdiction of federal child porno-
graphy statutes through a judicial act. Alternatively, the court could have
affirmed the convictions based on circumstantial evidence, effectively
holding that a reasonable jury could infer a connection between Internet
communications and interstate commerce without explicit evidence of
52. Id. at 1206.
53. Id. at 1205.
54. Id. at 1206.
55. Id. at 1206 n.11.
56. Precedential decisions in the Tenth Circuit demonstrate the court's willingness to find
interstate connections involving the Internet as well as its insistence that the evidence clearly show
movement of proscribed materials across state lines. In United States v. Kimler, the defendant was
found guilty after the government showed that images he received and distributed were routed
through the e-mail service provider's servers in California and the intemet service provider's ("ISP")
servers in Missouri in addition to arriving or departing from the defendant's Kansas-based computer.
335 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 2003). Similarly, in United States v. Simpson, the government se-
cured a conviction after introducing evidence that images downloaded over the Internet by the de-
fendant traveled from out-of-state websites or electronic bulletin boards to the defendant's computer.
152 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1998). But see United States v. Wilson, 182 F.3d 737, 744 (10th Cir.
1999) (overturning the defendant's conviction and finding the evidence insufficient to prove the
digital images moved through interstate commerce). The court even showed willingness to recog-
nize an interstate nexus where an e-mail sent between two parties both residing in Utah traveled
through the ISP's servers in Virginia before being routed back to Utah. United States v. Kammer-
sell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (1Oth Cir. 1999).
57. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1206-07.
58. See discussion supra Part I.B.
59. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1208 & n.8 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
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this fact.60  Despite such holdings in other circuits, however, the Tenth
Circuit declined to take this option.6'
C. The Tenth Circuit Splits from Her Sister Circuits
The jurisdictional considerations of federal child pornography sta-
tutes surfaced in cases decided by other Circuit Courts of Appeals prior
to Schaefer. The Tenth Circuit reviewed these cases and distinguished or
disagreed with each one.
1. The First, Fifth and Third Circuits Equate Internet Use with
Interstate Commerce
In United States v. Carroll, the First Circuit upheld the defendant's
conviction for persuading his thirteen-year-old niece to participate in the
production of sexually explicit photos in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2251(a).62  The jurisdictional element in Carroll differed from that in
Schaefer, requiring the government to prove only that the defendant
knew or had reason to know that the photos would be transported in in-
terstate commerce.63 Citing the victim's testimony that Carroll planned
to transport the photographs from New Hampshire to Massachusetts and
then distribute them on the Internet, the First Circuit held that
"[t]ransmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to
moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation
in interstate commerce."
64
Relying on the First Circuit's reasoning in Carroll, the Fifth Circuit
came to an identical conclusion in United States v. Runyan,65 "join[ing]
the First Circuit in holding that 'transmission of photographs by means
of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines
and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce' for the pur-
poses of 18 U.S.C. § 2251. "66 But the Fifth Circuit's Runyan opinion
went beyond the holding in Carroll and addressed a second jurisdictional
element that was identical to the one at work in Schaefer.67  Unlike
60. See id. at 1200; see also Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1139-40; United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d
1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2000).
61. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1203-05.
62. 105 F.3d 740, 741 (1st Cir. 1997). Note that Schaefer was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §
2252, not § 225 1(a).
63. Id. at 741-42. The jurisdictional element of § 2251 (a) only requires a showing of intent to
transport child pornography in interstate commerce. Id. at 741.
64. Id. at 742.
65. 290 F.3d 223, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). Runyan took sexually explicit photographs of a girl
when she was between the ages of fifteen and seventeen and told her that he intended to use the
Internet to sell the photographs internationally. Id. at 232-33, 238-39. Investigators also found CDs
in Runyan's possession containing images of child pornography. ld. at 232.
66. Id. at 239 (quoting Carroll, 105 F.3d at 742). Recall that the jurisdictional element of §
2251 only requires a showing of intent to transport child pornography in interstate commerce.
Carroll, 105 F.3d at 741.
67. Recall that the Tenth Circuit interpreted the jurisdictional element as requiring actual
interstate movement of the images of child pornography in question. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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Schaefer, the defendant in Runyan admitted to authorities that he knew
that some of the images found in his possession contained child porno-
graphy that had been downloaded from the Internet.68 Similar to Schae-
fer, however, one of the images featured an embedded Internet address.
Based on Runyan's admission and the embedded address, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that the Government adduced sufficient facts to "make a
specific connection between the images introduced at trial and the Inter-
,,69net ....
However, because a connection to the Internet was not enough to
prove interstate transport, the Fifth Circuit added that "circumstantial
evidence linking a particular image to the Internet (such as... a website
address embedded on the image) can be sufficient evidence of interstate
transportation to support a conviction .... ,70 Thus, not only was the
Fifth Circuit willing to infer a connection between Internet use and inter-
state commerce where only the intent to transport proscribed materials
was required for conviction, but the court was also willing to make the
inference under a statute requiring actual evidence of interstate transpor-
tation.
Finally, the Third Circuit made a similar assumption in United
States v. MacEwan, which addressed an evidentiary challenge similar to
the one in Schaefer.71 At trial, the district court convicted MacEwan of
receipt of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) based on
evidence that he had knowingly downloaded child pornography from the
Internet, an act that the district court concluded implicitly involved inter-
72state commerce. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that once "images of
child pornography [leave] the website server and enter[] the complex
global data transmission system that is the Internet, the images [are] be-
ing transported in interstate commerce. ' 73 In so holding, the court essen-
tially rewrote the jurisdictional element of the crime, stating that it "does
not matter whether MacEwan downloaded the images from a server lo-
cated within [his home state] or whether those images were transmitted
across state lines. It is sufficient that MacEwan downloaded those im-
ages from the Internet, a system that is inexorably intertwined with inter-
state commerce. 74
Based on these cases from the First, Fifth, and Third Circuits, it is
apparent that courts are willing to embrace the inference that mere Inter-
net use involves interstate commerce for the purpose of satisfying juris-
68. Runyan, 290 F.3d at 232.
69. Id. at 242.
70. Id.
71. 445 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2006).
72. Id. at 242.
73. Id. at 244.
74. Id. at 245.
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dictional elements in child pornography cases. However, the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Schaefer refused to take this position.
2. The Tenth Circuit Relied on Textual Arguments to Disagree with
Other Circuits
Addressing each of these cases, the Tenth Circuit distinguished or
disagreed with each one based on text of the relevant statute in Schaefer.
First, the court distinguished Carroll on the grounds that the jurisdiction-
al element in that case required only the intent to move photographs
across state lines, 75 whereas actual movement across state lines was re-
quired under § 2252 in Schaefer.76 This distinction also applies to the
Runyan case, which relied exclusively on the logic found in Carroll. In
both the Runyan and Carroll cases, the defendants plainly manifested the
necessary intent to use the Internet to distribute child pornography
beyond state boundaries.77 In both cases, therefore, the jurisdictional
requirements of the statute were satisfied independent of the defendant's
use of the Internet. Thus, it was unnecessary for the Runyan and Carroll
courts to equate Internet use with interstate commerce. Because the
holdings in Runyan and Carroll were logically unnecessary and because
the jurisdictional element in those cases was textually distinguishable,
the Tenth Circuit found the decisions unpersuasive.78
Oddly, the Tenth Circuit failed to address the second holding in Ru-
nyan, which presumed a connection between Internet use and interstate
commerce for the purpose of showing actual movement of proscribed
images across state lines.79 Rather, the court addressed this issue in its
treatment of the MacEwan case, with which it respectfully disagreed.
The Tenth Circuit argued that the MacEwan court's interpretation of the
jurisdictional element impermissibly expanded the statute by allowing
convictions to be based merely on the use of an interstate facility (the
Internet) rather than requiring actual proof that images moved across
state boundaries. The Tenth Circuit pointed to other federal statutes in
which Congress specifically used more expansive language to "crimina-
liz[e] the use of 'any facility of interstate ... commerce.', 8° The fact
75. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007).
76. Id. at 1201-02.
77. Carroll told his victim that he intended to transport the illicit photographs he took in New
Hampshire to his colleague's computer in Massachusetts for scanning. United States v. Carroll, 105
F.3d 740, 742 (lst Cir. 1997). Runyan offered to pay his victim after he sold the images over the
Internet to customers in Japan. United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 232-33, 238-39 (5th Cir.
2002).
78. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1203-05.
79. The facts in Runyan closely matched those in Schaefer. Investigators found Runyan in
possession of, among other things, CDs containing child pornography downloaded from the Intemet.
Runyan, 290 F.3d at 232. One of the images contained an embedded Intemet address like the videos
found in Schaefer's possession. Compare id. at 242, with Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1206. As noted
above, the cases also shared a common jurisdictional element requiring actual interstate movement
of images.
80. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1205 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2006)).
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that Congress did not use such expansive language in the child pornogra-
phy statutes at issue in Schaefer and MacEwan prompted the Tenth Cir-
cuit to reject the MacEwan court's conclusion that mere Internet use
without a proven interstate transmission satisfied the jurisdictional ele-
ment of the crime.8'
In summary, the Tenth Circuit's strict textual interpretation of the
jurisdictional element in Schaefer provided the foundation for the court's
split from her sister circuits and required actual proof that proscribed
images moved between states.82 The Tenth Circuit also held that such
proof could not be inferred from Internet use alone. 83 Because the gov-
ernment produced no evidence that Schaefer's images crossed state lines
other than his Internet use, the Tenth Circuit had no choice but to re-
verse. The court made an arguably reluctant decision that remained
faithful to the letter of the law84 and avoided judicial activism. However,
it triggered a rapid response from Congress.
III. NOT IN KANSAS ANYMORE? CONGRESS'S LEGISLATIVE REACTION
ECLIPSES STATE LAWS
On October 8, 2008, slightly more than thirteen months after the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Schaefer, Congress presented President
George W. Bush the Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of
2007, which he signed into law.85 Not only did Congress respond quick-
ly, it responded comprehensively. The updated legislation unambiguous-
ly equates Internet use with interstate commerce and expands federal
jurisdiction over child pornography to the full extent of Congress's
Commerce powers.86 Congress expressly stated that "[t]he transmission
of child pornography using the Internet constitutes transportation in in-
terstate commerce., 87 In addition, Congress modified the jurisdictional
elements of the child pornography statutes to prohibit any transport,
shipment, distribution, receipt, or possession of such materials "using
any means or facility of interstate ... commerce" or "in or affecting in-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1201-02.
83. Id. at 1202.
84. See id. at 1207-08 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
85. Rep. Boyda, Attorney General Steve Six Announce New Law to Protect Kansas Kids From
Predators, U.S. FED. NEWS, Oct. 15, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 20424888. The bill, authored
by Kansas Representative Nancy Boyda, passed the House of Representatives only 70 days after the
Tenth Circuit's ruling by a vote of 409 to zero. Biggert Combats Child Exploitation: House Passes
Bill to Close Child Pornography Loophole in Federal Law, STATES NEWS SERV., Nov. 14, 2007.
The Senate required less than a year to add provisions strengthening the federal government's ability
to prosecute Internet child pornographers and then returned the bill to the House for final approval,
which was secured by a margin of 418 to zero on September 26, 2008. Boyda Hails Senate Passage
of Her Bill to Protect Kansas Kids From Predators, STATES NEWS SERV., Sep. 24, 2008; Biggert
Bill To Prevent Child Exploitation Heads To White House: New Legislation Will Close Child Por-
nography Loophole In Federal Law, STATES NEWS SERV., Sep. 26, 2008.
86. See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 Stat.
4001 (2008).
87. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act §102(7).
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terstate" or foreign commerce.88 As the Tenth Circuit itself stated in
Schaefer, Congress's use of the "term 'affecting interstate or foreign
commerce' conveys its intent to exert full Commerce Clause power. 89
With this response, Congress ensured that prosecution of all acts involv-
ing child pornography can take place at the federal level-not just in
Kansas anymore.
A. The Current State of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Congress's response decisively closed the evidentiary loophole in
Schaefer: no longer must federal prosecutors prove that proscribed im-
ages cross state lines "in commerce" to satisfy the jurisdictional element
of federal child pornography statutes. The revised statute now proscribes
all shipment, transportation, distribution, or receipt of child pornography
using any means or facility of interstate commerce or in or affecting in-
terstate commerce. 9° In addition, courts no longer must wrestle with the
assumption that Internet use involves interstate commerce. 9' These
changes will undoubtedly receive constitutional scrutiny in future prose-
cutions, requiring careful Commerce Clause analysis. The discussion
below summarizes current Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
1. The Lopez Framework for Regulation of Interstate Commerce
Recent Commerce Clause decisions include the trilogy of United
States v. Lopez,92 United States v. Morrison,93 and Gonzales v. Raich.94
The Lopez decision established Congress's authority to regulate three
areas under the Commerce Clause: (1) the channels of interstate com-
merce;95 (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; 96 and (3) activi-
ties that substantially affect interstate commerce.9 7 Disputed applications
of Commerce Clause power tend to involve the third aspect of Con-
gress's power. In Lopez,98 the Court considered four factors to determine
whether Congress can constitutionally regulate a given activity under the
Commerce power: (1) whether the regulated activity is economic; (2) the
presence of a statutory jurisdictional element limiting the statute's appli-
cation to interstate activities; (3) legislative findings linking the prohi-
88. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act § 103.
89. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007).
90. See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act § 103.
91. See id. § 102(7).
92. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
93. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
94. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
95. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. Channels of interstate commerce include such things as the
interstate highway system and the waters of the United States.
96. Id. Instrumentalities of interstate commerce include people and things in interstate com-
merce like vehicles, aircraft, and interstate shipments.
97. Id. at 558-59.
98. The defendant in Lopez challenged § 922(q) of the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990
(GFSZA), which prohibited possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone. Id. at 551
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
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bited activity to interstate commerce; and (4) the degree of attenuation
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. 99 Having estab-
lished this analytical framework in Lopez, the Court later applied it in
Morrison and Raich.
2. Applying Lopez to Potentially Non-Economic Activities
Both Morrison and Raich addressed potentially non-economic ac-
tivities, but the Court treated each differently. Addressing the issue of
violence against women in Morrison, the Court confirmed the value of
statutory jurisdictional elements'0° and congressional findings 01 when it
struck down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. The court found
that neither factor provided dispositive grounds to uphold the federal
statute, which regulated non-commercial activities. 102 In so holding, the
court implied that such statutes may require a closer nexus to interstate




Reaching the Supreme Court five years after Morrison, the case of
Gonzales v. Raich represents a situation where the Court found sufficient
grounds to uphold federal regulation of non-commercial activity: the
growth, possession, and distribution of medical marijuana prohibited
under the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA").1°4 The Court found that
Congress could rationally regulate home-grown, non-commercial medi-
cal marijuana because it was "part of an economic 'class of activities'
that [has] a substantial effect on interstate commerce,"'1 5 and failure to
control this source of marijuana could undercut the government's execu-
tion of the broader war on drugs.1°6 The Raich decision suggests that the
Court viewed home cultivation of medical marijuana as an activity with
such a close connection to interstate commerce that the non-commercial
99. Id. at 559-68; Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On
Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOIRE DAME L. REV. 2101,
2109 (2006). Ultimately, the Lopez majority concluded that possession of a firearm near a school
was not an inherently economic activity, and was in fact severely attenuated from interstate com-
merce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. The additional lack of a jurisdictional element or congressional
findings linking gun possession to interstate activity provided the Court with ample evidence that the
challenged statute exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power. Id. at 561-63.
100. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). In Morrison, the Court consi-
dered § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provided a federal civil
cause of action for victims of gender violence. Id. at 601-02 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994 &
Supp. 1995)). The Court in Morrison held that the lack of a jurisdictional hook contributed to the
unconstitutionality of the statute and cited other provisions of VAWA that appropriately included
jurisdictional hooks. Id. at 613 & n.5, 626-27; Stuckey, supra note 99, at 2109-10.
101. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15. Notably, VAWA's preamble included extensive con-
gressional findings linking violence against women to negative impacts on interstate commerce. Id.
102. Id. at 613-15.
103. See id. at 611.
104. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). The plaintiffs in Raich challenged the government's ability under the
Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") to seize their medical marijuana, arguing that their operations
represented strictly intrastate, non-commercial activity. Id. at 7-8 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
(2000)).
105. Id. at 17.
106. Id. at 26-27.
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product could easily enter the interstate commercial market. Most im-
portantly, the Court provided Congress with a legislative alternative to
the jurisdictional element-in situations involving a broad statutory
scheme such as the CSA, the Court would generally avoid striking down
narrow, individual provisions of the applicable law. 107
In summary, Congress may comfortably regulate the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 0 8 However, where Congress
chooses to regulate under the third prong of its Commerce Power-in
areas substantially affecting interstate commerce-two options exist.
First, if Congress enacts a specific, narrow statute, it must demonstrate
an adequate connection to interstate commerce through congressional
findings, use of a jurisdictional hook, or, preferably, both. 1°9 Second,
where Congress enacts a sweeping statute addressing multiple, interre-
lated economic activities, less evidence of an interstate nexus may be
required.110 The future of Commerce Clause jurisprudence remains an
open question; the recent amendments to federal child pornography sta-
tutes may raise controversies that prompt answers from the federal
courts.
B. Looming Commerce Clause Questions Related to Federal Child
Pornography Statutes
The 2008 amendments to federal child pornography laws eliminated
several statutory loopholes. First, Congress clearly equated the move-
ment of child pornography over the Internet with interstate commerce,
regardless of whether images actually cross state lines. 1 ' Congress also
added all facilities of interstate commerce to the proscribed means of
transporting child pornography,' 12 again implicating all Internet facilities
such as servers, telephone and cable lines, and cellular phones. The sta-
tutory modifications ensured that the courts will never again lack statuto-
ry jurisdiction to uphold the convictions of purveyors and consumers of
Internet child pornography. However, the changes also present two im-
portant questions. First, does Congress have the authority to regulate
purely intrastate occurrences of child pornography solely because it uti-
lizes or occurs over the Internet? And second, do the revised statutes
expand into areas beyond what was required to close the evidentiary loo-
phole in Schaefer?
107. Stuckey, supra note 99, at 2124.
108. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
109. See United States v. Morrson, 529 U.S. 598, 613-18 (2000).
110. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 26-33.
111. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 102(7), 122
Stat. 4001, 4002 (2008).
112. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act § 103.
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1. The Aggregation Principle Allows Federal Regulation of Purely
Intrastate Activity
In the New Deal Era case of Wickard v. Filburn, a single farmer's
violation of federal wheat growing quotas-where the excess wheat was
consumed on the individual's farm-was found to frustrate federal regu-
lation of the national wheat supply. 113 On the assertions that local activi-
ties substantially affecting interstate commerce can be regulated by Con-
gress' 4 and that, in the aggregate, local consumption of wheat grown in
excess of quotas substantially affected the interstate wheat market, 5 the
Supreme Court upheld federal fines levied against the defendant. Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court upheld this aggregation principle and ex-
tended it to non-economic or quasi-economic goods in the Raich deci-
sion, discussed above.'
1 16
Based on Wickard and Raich, the ability of Congress to regulate
purely local incidences of child pornography1 17 simply because they in-
volve the Internet rests on the argument that, in the aggregate, an in-
crease in purely local use of the Internet to distribute, view, and down-
load child pornography may have a significant effect on the overall inter-
state supply and availability of child pornography on the Internet. Thus,
Congress likely enjoys the authority to regulate purely intrastate activity
solely because it utilizes or occurs over the Internet. The expansion of
federal child pornography statutes following Schaefer unquestionably
achieves these regulatory goals. But did the revisions go beyond what
was required to prevent the next William Schaefer from avoiding prison?
2. Going Beyond Schaefer: Congress Expands Federal Jurisdiction
to Purely Local Activity
What if Schaefer had been caught in possession of non-digital im-
ages depicting the sexual exploitation of children? Similarly, what if
Schaefer had entered an adult bookstore intending to view locally-
produced child pornography? The revised federal statutes appear to pro-
hibit these activities as well.' 18
113. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
114. Id. at 125.
115. Id. at 127-28.
116. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
117. Such a case would occur where a defendant accesses images of child pornography via the
Internet but where the source of the images and all of the communications facilities utilized reside in
the same state as the defendant.
118. The revised federal child pornography statutes prohibit any transportation, shipment,
distribution, or receipt of child pornography using any means or facility of interstate commerce or in
or affecting interstate commerce. In addition, the statutes proscribe knowingly possessing or access-
ing, with the intent to view, any child pornography that has been transported or shipped using any
means or facility of interstate commerce or in or affecting interstate commerce. Effective Child
Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, §§ 103, 203, 122 Stat. 4001, 4002-04
(2008).
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a. Purely Intrastate Possession of Child Pornography
Proponents of federal regulation of purely intrastate possession ar-
gue against the constitutionality of the revised statutes based on the non-
infinity principle, a concept that prohibits endless aggregation of intras-
tate activity that would give the federal government "unlimited power to
regulate all activity, including activity that has historically been the prov-
ince of the states . . . ."1 9 Indeed, the Lopez Court found that intrastate
possession of an item was not necessarily economic activity that substan-
tially affects interstate commerce.1 20 In addition, producers and consum-
ers of child pornography often exchange images of children by gifting
rather than by purchasing,12 increasing the degree to which their activi-
ties are separated from commerce. These factors suggest that the revised
jurisdictional element which expands federal powers to any possession of
child pornography substantially affecting interstate commerce fails as a
meaningful restriction of federal jurisdiction, and therefore fails constitu-
tional scrutiny.
On the other hand, non-digital images of child pornography sadly
achieve a quasi-economic character more similar to Raich's marijuana
than Lopez's firearm: they are highly sought after by a group of offend-
ers, and even these non-digital images could easily enter the stream of
interstate and foreign commerce with a few clicks of a mouse in today's
world. Furthermore, the statutory scheme of the Effective Child Porno-
graphy Prosecution Act employs a broad approach to eliminate both the
supply of and demand for child pornography. 122 This scheme, combined
with the quasi-economic character of pornographic images of children,
may combine to place future intrastate possession cases within the
framework of Gonzalez v. Raich. Under such a scenario, a court would
likely find that the federal statutes represent a valid exercise of Con-
gress's Commerce authority because failure to regulate the purely local
possession of child pornography would undermine the broader federal
statutory scheme by failing to address a cumulatively large supply of the
proscribed materials. 
123
b. Accessing Child Pornography with the Intent to View
While the prohibitions on production, transportation, and distribu-
tion of child pornography attempt to eradicate the supply of such mate-
rials, a new provision of the Effective Child Pornography Prosecution
119. Susanna Frederick Fisher, Between Scylla And Charybdis: The Disagreement Among the
Federal Circuits over Whether Federal Law Criminalizing the Intrastate Possession of Child Porno-
graphy Violates the Commerce Clause, 10 NExus 99, 101 (2005).
120. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-68 (1995).
121. E.g., Dan X. McGraw, Ex-Pastor Guilty of Child Porn: Former Methodist Minister Ad-
mitted Trading Images Online, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 20, 2009, at 2B.
122. Cf Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24-29 (2005).
123. See id. at 31-32.
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Act attempts to curb demand by prohibiting any person from knowingly
accessing child pornography with the intent to view.' 24 This provision
creates the ultimate expression of Congressional intent to prohibit indi-
vidual, intrastate acts, and seemingly reaches every act of seeking out
child pornography, regardless of its source. The critical statutory ques-
tion related to this provision is whether the required state of mind-
knowingly-applies to the nature of the images or materials in question
as child pornography. As amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) reads:
Any person who . . . knowingly accesses with intent to view, 1 or
more [materials] which contain any visual depiction that has been
mailed, or has been shipped or transported using any means or facili-
ty of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which
have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means includ-
ing by computer, if-(i) the producing of such visual depiction in-
volves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished as
provided .... 125
If the mens rea includes knowledge that the visual depiction involves the
use of a minor, the revised statute may fall within the scope of Gonzales
v. Raich as an essential component of a broad regulatory scheme. 126
However, if the mental state does not apply to the use of a minor in the
accessed and viewed images, this provision may also ensnare individuals
who access and view images that they believe depict adults engaged in
sexually explicit conduct. Such a scenario would result in strict liability
for engaging in legal, though perverse, conduct. As an example, consid-
er the case of a producer of adult pornography who mass produces videos
and images involving a seventeen-year-old actor or actress. Suppose the
distributed videos and images either lack statements or contain false
statements establishing the majority age of all depicted persons. 127 Any-
one knowingly accessing these videos or images in any situation may be
liable under § 2252 unless the mens rea is extended to include know-
ledge that the actor or actress is a minor.
Upcoming enforcement actions will determine the constitutional va-
lidity of the revised federal child pornography statutes. For now, it is
sufficient to note that the amendments represent a vast and perhaps ques-
124. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 203, 122
Stat. 4001,4003-04 (2008).
125. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (West 2009) (emphasis added).
126. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 28-29. This reading of Raich is fairly broad. In Raich, the Court
addressed the issue of production of non-economic or quasi-economic goods rather than possession
or accessing such goods with the intent to view. However, the breadth of Raich remains unsettled.
For purposes of this discussion, a wide reading of Raich brings within its scope the statutory prohibi-
tion of accessing child pornography with the intent to view.
127. See 'Girls Gone Wild' Company, Founder to Pay $2.3M in Sexual Exploitation Case,
FoxNEWS.COM, Sept. 13, 2006, http:lwww.foxnews.comlstory/0,2933,213496,00.html.
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tionable expansion of federal jurisdiction. A reasonable reading of the
revised statutory landscape leaves no conceivable act related to child
pornography outside of the purview of the federal government.
IV. THE UNFORTUNATE EFFECT OF SCHAEFER ON STATE LAWS
The outcome of Schaefer likely resulted from deficient investigation
and prosecution rather than deficient federal statutes. Schaefer's prose-
cutors plainly misunderstood the evidence required to satisfy the jurisdic-
tional element of the federal child pornography statutes and failed to
produce any facts linking the images in Schaefer's possession to the In-
ternet or showing the movement of images across state lines.128  Such
evidence appears relatively simple to obtain, as evidenced by the number
of Internet child pornography convictions upheld by the Tenth Circuit.
129
The Schaefer decision was arguably the correct outcome of the law, even
though it secured the freedom of an obviously guilty pedophile.
130
No sensible person would argue that the federal government should
be soft on criminals engaging in or supporting the child pornography
market. Yet the question of how to be tougher on crime deserves a more
thoughtful response than simply broadening federal statutes to include
more criminal activity, especially in cases where relevant state statutes
provide effective means to achieve the desired result. The critical issue
that has not been addressed is whether federal prosecution of Schaefer
was appropriate at all.
A. Prosecuting Schaefer Under Kansas Statutes Would Have Secured a
Conviction
Kansas maintains broad prohibitions on sexual exploitation of child-
ren, covering any act of enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit
conduct. 13' The statute also prohibits possession of any visual depiction
of a minor engaged in such activity.132 Jurisdictional clauses requiring
movement of persons or images across designated boundaries remain
logically absent from the state statutes since the Kansas legislature, un-
128. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 28, at 6-10.
129. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1202-03 (2007); see also United States v. Kim-
ter, 335 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Wilson, 182 F.3d 737, 744 & n.4 (10th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1998).
130. See Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1207-08 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
131. KAN.STAT.ANN. §21-3516(a) (2008).
Sexual exploitation of a child is: (1) ... employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing
or coercing a child under 18 years of age to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the
purpose of promoting any performance; (2) possessing any visual depiction, including
any photograph, film, video picture, digital or computer generated image or picture,
whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical or other means, where such visual
depiction of a child under 18 years of age is shown or heard engaging in sexually explicit
conduct with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interest
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like Congress, is not a creature of limited legislative authority. Thus, any
violation occurring within Kansas-whether or not in connection with
the Internet-may be prohibited based on the state's plenary police pow-
ers. The evidence presented during Schaefer's trial easily satisfied the
elements of the Kansas law, and would have secured an unassailable
conviction at the state level.
The main differences between the federal and state statutes in this
case involved sentencing, which varied based upon the age of the victim
at the time the crime was committed. 33 Since the available facts provide
no insight into the ages of the children used to produce the images in
Schaefer's possession, little can be said about the potential severity of his
sentence under Kansas law. But make no mistake - prosecuting Schaefer
under federal law resulted in acquittal, where the same evidence in a
Kansas courtroom would have put Schaefer in jail for at least fifty
months.
B. Should the Federal Government Prosecute All Crimes Tangentially
Involving the Internet?
As described in Part IV of this Comment, Congress reacted to the
Tenth Circuit's Schaefer reversal by expanding federal jurisdiction to the
limits of the Commerce power.134 But is this the most appropriate re-
sponse to a mismanaged prosecution? Just because the federal govern-
ment has the power to regulate crimes potentially affecting interstate
commerce does not mean that it should. Currently, federal statutes con-
tain thousands of crimes, including many that address the core interests
of states in protecting the health and safety of their citizenry. 135 As more
criminals like William Schaefer begin to avail themselves of opportuni-
ties presented by the Internet, this number is sure to grow. In addition,
the federal government is likely to continue its expansion into local crim-
inal law because of the political benefits to incumbent lawmakers.'
36
Many commentators have addressed the expansion of federal power
through the Commerce Clause; however, the impact of the Internet on
this evolution merits special attention.
133. The first offense for sexual exploitation of a minor in Kansas carries a minimum sentence
of 50 months in prison, while a similar offense under the federal statute involves a 60 month jail
sentence. Likewise, repeat offenders in Kansas face shorter prison sentences (9 to 10 years) than
they would at the federal level (15 to 40 years). An exception to the Kansas sentencing guidelines
exists if the victim is less than 14 years of age; in such a case, a mandatory hard sentence (which
allows no early parole) of 25 years imprisonment may be imposed for a first offense. Second and
third offenses in Kansas where the victim is less than 14 years old receive hard sentences of 40 years
and life without parole, respectively. Compare Kansas Sentencing Guidelines, Office of the District
Attorney, Sedgwick County (2005), http://www.sedgwickcountyorg/da/sentencinggrid.html, and
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3516(c), 21-4643 (2008), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(b) (West 2009).
134. See discussion supra Part IH.
135. See Ryan K. Stumphauzer, Note, Electronic Impulses, Digital Signals, and Federal Juris-
diction: Congress's Commerce Clause Power in the Twenty-First Century, 56 VAND. L. REv. 277,
284 (2003).
136. Id. at 285.
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1. Principles of Notice, Consistency and Federalism Present
Competing Arguments Regarding Federal Regulation of
Activities Involving the Internet
Readily apparent jurisdictional boundaries do not exist on the Inter-
net,' 37 with the exception of some state government websites and some
non-American websites that indicate a state or country of origin in their
web address. As a result, many Internet users have little notice as to
whether they have crossed jurisdictional boundaries while surfing the
web. 138 Some commentators argue in favor of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion over the Internet because websites provide insufficient notice of
potential jurisdiction in other locations.' 39 Congressional findings related
to the Internet Tax Freedom Act support this argument: "Addresses on
the Internet are designed to be geographically indifferent. Internet
transmissions are insensitive to physical distance and can have multiple
geographical addresses." 4° The findings also stated that it is "infeasible
to separate domestic intrastate Internet transmissions from interstate and
foreign Internet transmissions. 1 41  Thus, concerns about uniformity of
law and jurisdictional notice favor exclusive federal regulation of the
Internet.
142
However, as communications in the United States and worldwide
increasingly rely on the backbone of the Internet and other new technol-
ogies, a growing number of local crimes will incorporate interstate com-
ponents ranging from routing an e-mail or file transfer across state lines
to utilizing cell phone towers located in multiple states. 143 Many crimes
now committed using the Internet and other inherently interstate systems
have typically been the province of state governments-"the 'ordinary'
crimes that target random citizens."'144 This expansion of federal power
was a cause for concern for judges and states during the early stages of
the Internet's growth as a publicly available tool. In United States v.
Paredes, 45 the judge warned that the quickening pace of technological
advancement would allow the federal government "to prosecute types of
crimes from which it was barred in recent years, thus expanding the ju-
risdiction of the federal government to surpass that originally contem-
137. Charles R. Topping, Note, The Surf Is Up, But Who Owns the Beach?-Who Should
Regulate Commerce on the Internet?, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 179, 189-90
(1999).
138. Id. at 189.
139. See id. at 189-90, 220-22.
140. S. 442, 105th Cong. § 2(2), 144 CONG. REC. S11269-01 (1998) (enacted).
141. Id. § 2(3).
142. See id. § 2(8).
143. See Stumphauzer, supra note 135, at 282.
144. Forbes, supra note 8, at 195.
145. 950 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), overruled by United States v. Perez, 404 F.3d 302 (2d
Cit. 2005). Paredes involved a murder-for-hire case in which the defendant challenged his convic-
tion under federal statute, arguing that no interstate nexus existed despite the use of a paging system
with interstate capabilities during the crime. 950 F. Supp. at 584-85; Forbes, supra note 8, at 209-
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plated by the framers of the Constitution, who feared an excessively cen-
tralized government."'
' 46
2. For Child Pornography Crimes, Cooperative Federalism
Provides a Robust Solution
Exercise of the federal power requires constant justification through
the use of jurisdictional elements or broad statutory schemes that poten-
tially eclipse state laws.147 By revising federal statutes in the wake of
Schaefer, Congress chose the latter option in the case of child pornogra-
phy and went beyond regulation of crimes involving the Internet into
purely local crimes often prosecuted by states. However, as demonstrat-
ed in Schaefer, such broad federal regulation can prevent simpler and
more effective state solutions from securing needed convictions as states
decide to conserve their resources and defer to federal prosecutors. In
addition, federal laws that reach all local crimes threaten states' ability to
adopt different approaches to regulation. In the example of child porno-
graphy, states may wish to experiment with rehabilitation of first time
offenders or deal differently with crimes involving possession or access-
ing of proscribed images. The manner in which Congress expanded fed-
eral jurisdiction over local child pornography crimes virtually assures
constitutional challenges based on Congress's ability to regulate these
local activities. Regrettably, more child pornographers may go free as
courts resolve this complicated issue.
In the future, Congress should spend more than just a few weeks
148
considering the consequences of dramatic expansions of federal police
powers such as the one seen in the wake of Schaefer. A better alternative
would be to allow states "to preside over cases where there is a substan-
tial vested interest in protection of the state's citizenry.' 49 This ap-
proach does not necessarily preclude federal involvement. Federal re-
sources could still support state pursuit of the exploding number of local
crimes that, because of technology use, tangentially implicate interstate
commerce. The binary approach of federal versus state jurisdiction
should yield to a cooperative approach of utilizing federal resources in
combination with less complicated, and often more successful, state
laws. In Schaefer's case, such an approach would surely have secured a
conviction.
CONCLUSION
William Schaefer was guilty of possessing child pornography.
Without question, he was guilty under Kansas law; he should have found
no relief in the federal statutes under which he was tried. However, be-
146. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. at 590; Forbes, supra note 8, at 210.
147. See Commerce Clause discussion supra Part ml.A.
148. See supra note 85.
149. Forbes, supra note 8, at 206.
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cause of poor prosecution and decision making, Schaefer escaped con-
viction on an evidentiary technicality. Prosecutors at the federal level
must recognize that state laws are often less complicated and more capa-
ble than federal laws at catching and convicting local criminals. The rise
of the Internet has grafted an interstate component onto many traditional-
ly local crimes,15° providing a politically ripe opportunity for Congress to
expand its jurisdiction and intrude into areas of criminal law typically
regulated by states.
In response to Schaefer's acquittal, Congress invoked its Commerce
Power to expand federal jurisdiction over crimes involving child porno-
graphy. 151 This expansion arguably leaves no act involving child porno-
graphy beyond the reach of federal authorities. In the rush to appear
tough on crime, however, federal lawmakers left the amended statutes
open to constitutional scrutiny-an act that may result in acquittal of
more criminals who could easily be jailed under state laws. Before in-
truding on areas of law traditionally left to the states, Congress should
consider innovative ways for the federal government to utilize effective
state statutes to achieve their goals. The Internet has allowed criminals
to innovate. Why should it not have the same effect on Congress?
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